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Contribution Among Pennsylvania Tort-Feasors
Imagine that Driver X and Driver Y are approaching an intersection. Driver X runs a red light and collides with Driver Y. Driver
Y, however, is intoxicated. P, a passenger in Y's car, sustains injuries
caused by the collision. P sues X and Y. Prior to trial, P settles with
Driver Y for $10,000.00, and releases only Driver Y and no other
tort-feasor. Subsequently, a jury verdict of $20,000.00 is returned in
favor of P finding X 60% negligent, and Y, the settling tort-feasor,
only 4007o negligent. What result as to all of the relevant parties?
What are their rights and responsibilities? And the bottom line, how
much must each pay?
Because of the very difficult and unsettling problems which befall
this topic in Pennsylvania, as well as in other jurisdictions, it is
important that we gain an understanding of the history and devel:
opment of contribution among tort-feasors. This can best be done
in this jurisdiction' by analyzing the rule under the common law;
that is, the rule existing prior to the Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets2
decision in 1987, and the rule established by the Giant Eagle, case.
The case law cited in Giant Eagle4 gives us an excellent vehicle in
which to journey into the past to witness the law's development.
The common law treated joint tort-feasors very harshly. Joint tortfeasors had no right to contribution, and a settlement and release
acted to release all tort-feasors, regardless of the express terms of
the release.' There were basically two lines of reasoning which were
used to justify this harshness. The first reason was that the tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable, meaning that each was liable
for the whole of the damage, and plaintiff could have but one
recovery. 6 If plaintiff went after one defendant, the recovery awarded

1. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
2. Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1 (1987).
3.
4.

Id.
Id.

5. Thompson v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A.2d 107 (1937). Accord Hilbert v.
Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959). "Contribution" is described as the act of
requiring one defendant, who was partially responsible for a tortious wrong, to pay
a portion of the damages to another defendant, who was made to pay the entire
award. A "settlement" is a private contract between a plaintitff and defendant,
whereby that defendant is released from liability for a sum of money.
6. Thompson, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A.2d 107.
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to plaintiff, from that defendant, was treated as a satisfaction of all
claims against all defendants, thus releasing all other defendants. 7
The basis of joint and several liability was that common law courts
did not have a manner of apportioning liability among defendants. 8
The second reason is that contribution was a topic of equity, and
equity would not aid wrongdoers in an attempt to extract contribution
from one another. 9 This same equitable principal, and the lack of
ability to apportion liability, also barred plaintiff's recovery if he
was contributorily negligent. 0
Application of the common law principles to the hypothetical at
the beginning of this comment would achieve the following results.
Plaintiff, having settled with one tort-feasor for $10,000.00 and
having released him, would have released the other tort-feasor,
regardless of the express terms of the release. Thus, the plaintiff
would collect only $10,000.00, or half of the jury verdict. X, despite
being 60% negligent for the injury, would pay nothing. Y, who was
only 4007o negligent for the injury, would pay 50% of the jury verdict
and could not seek contribution from X because equity would not
apportion liability among wrongdoers." This result is softened by
remembering that the common law had no way of arriving at the
percentage of liability demonstrated in the hypothetical. Arguably,
this is the root problem of the common law view.
However harsh, the common law cannot be said to be unchanging
and unforgiving. To make the view more palatable, certain exceptions
were carved from the strict common law rule. One exception pertained
to contribution, where the rule was interpreted to bar contribution
among wrongdoers only when the tort-feasors committed an act
which they knew was wrong, immoral, criminal in nature, or where
the act was intentional.12 Puller v. Puller3 later held common law
contribution to be the well established law in Pennsylvania.14 A few

7. Id.
8. Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954).
As the apportionment of liability was considered too speculative at this time, common
law judges had not yet discovered a fair method of accomplishing this aim.
9. Id.
10. Borough of Carlisle v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. 544, 6 A. 372 (1886). The
amount of plaintiff's negligence could similarly not be apportioned for the reason
stated supra note 8.
11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12. Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928).
13. Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955).
14. Id. at 221, 110 A.2d at 177.
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exceptions were also made to the rule that plaintiff's contributory
negligence was a complete bar to recovery. Included in these were
that, normally, rescuers' 5 were excepted, as were plaintiffs involved
in actions where the conduct of the defendants was willful, wanton
or reckless in nature. ,6 Any of the exceptions mentioned above would
alter the common law result of the hypothetical as follows: since the
conduct of the hypothetical defendants was merely negligent, Y could
now seek contribution from X in the amount of $5,000.00.11 Plaintiff,
however, would still collect merely half of the would-be jury verdict.18
.These common law principles were further refined and sharpened
20
by Daugherty v. Hershberger9 in 1956, and Mong v. Hershberger
in 1963. Both involved derivations of the same automobile negligence
actions. Daugherty2 ' involved an issue of first impression 22 whereby,
in order to facilitate a decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had to interpret section 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act. 23 The facts of Daugherty4 were that on July 13,
1952, a three vehicle collision occurred at an intersection in Erie
County. 25 The vehicles were driven by Daugherty, Hershberger, and
Mong. 26 Daugherty and all of his passengers, which included his
wife, three children, and Carl and Gertrude Williams, sued for
personal injuries. 27 Carl Williams subsequently died and his administratrix brought suit on behalf of the estate. 2 Daugherty and all six
passengers entered into a settlement with defendant Mong. 29 The
values of that settlement3 ° must be displayed in order to gain a full
understanding of the case:

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Corbin v. City of Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, 45 A. 1070 (1900).
Ennis v. Atkin, 354 Pa. 165, 47 A.2d 217 (1946).
See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Daughtery v. Hershberger, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956).
Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1963).
Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
Id. at 369, 126 A.2d at 731.
12 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2082 (Purdon 1951) (repealed).
Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
Id. at 369, 126 A.2d at 731.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370, 126 A.2d at 732.
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Child # 1
Child # 2
Child # 3
Wife
Gertrude Williams
Estate of Carl D. Williams
Total
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$ 5,145.23
425.00
650.00
1,000.00
779.77
1,500.00
4,000.00
$ 13,500.00

Mong had been released and discharged 3' from all liability under the
1951 Act.12 The remaining tort-feasor's liability was reduced by 50%,
Mong's pro-rata share of the release 33 (one of two tort-feasors). 34
Subsequently, jury verdicts were returned in favor of the plaintiffs
in the following amounts:
Wilbert Daugherty
Child # 1
Child # 2
Child # 3
Wife
Gertrude Williams
Estate of Carl D. Williams
Total

$ 5,559.49
500.00
1,000.00
500.00
2,000.00
1,161.50
1,000.00
$ 11,720.99

The trial court ruled 35 that Hershberger, the non-settling tort-feasor,
was liable to plaintiffs for 50% of the jury's assessment of the
damages or $5,860.50, irrespective of the amount received by way
of settlement with Mong.3 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted allocatur, then reversed and remanded. 37 In reversing, the

31.

Id.

32. 12 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2082 (Purdon 1951) (repealed).
33. The reason that Mong's pro-rata share of the liability was decided to be
5007o was that the law at this time had discovered a system whereby percentages of
liability were decided according to the number of tort-feasors.
34. Since there were two tort-feasors in this case, and an absence of contributory negligence, these two were considered 100076 negligent for the entire wrong.
Hence, liability was apportioned at 50076 each. Were there three tort-feasors involved;
33-1/3% would have been apportioned to each of the three.
35. Daugherty, 386 Pa. at 371, 126 A.2d at 732.
36.

Id.

37.

Id. at 375, 126 A.2d at 732.
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court modified the trial court's holding, stating that Hershberger was
entitled to credit the amounts Mong paid in excess of what the jury
awarded plaintiffs, and deduct it from his liability of $5,860.50.38
Because Mong paid certain plaintiffs a total in excess of $4,021.23,
Hershberger was entitled to subtract that excess from his total liability
and thus paid only $1,839.26.1 9
Mr. Justice Musmanno dissented, arguing that this question was
one of fairness, not of mathematics.40 He stated that Hershberger's
contention was astounding, the majority's approval of such even
more so, 4' and that the decision would benefit a person not at all a
party to the settlement negotiation. 42 The decision of the majority
was also criticized on the grounds that it was based neither upon
precedent, nor reason, 43 as it sought to blend a contract and a
judgment in an attempt to make them one. 4 In conjunction with the
fairness argument, Justice Musmanno also reiterated the purpose of
the Act of 195 1 4 5-to encourage potential litigants to settle;"6 some47
thing that this holding certainly does little to advance.
The harsh Daugherty rule was, however, further refined by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Mong v. Hershberger," a case in
which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allocatur.4 9 The
facts of Mong ° are identical to the facts in Daugherty,5' except that
Mong brought suit against Hershberger for contribution.5 2 The superior court found that a settling tort-feasor who was released from
liability for his pro-rata share, but paid more than his share of the
subsequent jury verdict, could seek contribution of 500 from the
non-settling tort-feasor5 3 This court did so purely on equitable grounds

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 376, 126 A.2d at 734.
42. Id. at 377, 126 A.2d at 737.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 381, 126 A.2d at 737.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 382, 126 A.2d at 737. As Justice Musmanno points out, this type
of treatment will frighten those who settle by forcing them to do what they chose
to avoid by settling-going to court.
48. Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1963).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
52. Mong, 200 Pa. Super. at 70, 186 A.2d at 428.
53. Id. at 72, 186 A.2d at 429.
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to further the purpose of the statute.14 This being the case, let us
return to the hypothetical.
Under Daugherty", plaintiff would recover $20,000.00 or the amount
of the jury verdict. Ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) had already
been paid by Y for his release, as to his pro-rata share. X would be
required to pay the plaintiff $10,000.00, even though his 60%o share
of the damages is really $12,000.00, since X is entitled to credit Y's
$2,000.00 overpayment against that $12,000.00. Thus, the following
result is reached. Y would have no right to contribution. But Under
the equity principle developed in Mong5 6 Y would be able to seek
contribution to the extent that Y overpaid his pro-rata share. This
would result in X paying Y $2,000.00. The end result is that plaintiff
gets his $20,000.00; $8,000.00 from Y and $12,000.00 from X,
according to their assigned percentage of liability. This result is
perfectly fair, yet the objective of the Act 57 -settlement-is deterred
more than encouraged. The outcome reached in the above hypothet5 8 and Mong,5 9
ical, based on Daugherty
occurred before Pennsylvania
had adopted a comparative negligence system.6
In 1987, in the case of Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets,6' contribution among tort-feasors was again discovered, and altered, pursuant to the adoption of principles of comparative negligence.6 2
Comparative negligence is now used in place of common law contributory negligence. As a result of this new system, fault may now
be apportioned among tort-feasors on a percentage basis.6 The only
case interpreting the new law is the one that established the new
law-Charles v. Giant Eagle,6 a case of first impression.6 5 The facts
of this case follow.
On January 17, 1977, George Charles suffered injuries as the result
of a fall near the door of a Giant Eagle retail store, when he slipped

54. Id. See Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289 (1961).
55. Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
56. Mong, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427.
57. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8321, et seq. (Purdon 1978).
58. Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
59. Mong, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427.
60. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1978). This section is basically
a reenactment of 17 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101 and 2102 (Purdon 1976). See infra
note 82 and accompanying text.
61. Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1 (1987).
62. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1978).
63. Id.
64. Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1.
65. Id. at 476, 522 A.2d at 2.
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on an ice-covered automatic door mat while applying pressure to a
malfunctioning electric door. 66 The door was manufactured by Stanley
Magic Door, Inc. and Jed Door, (hereinafter "Stanley"). Accord-67
ingly, Charles filed suit against both Giant Eagle and Stanley.
Before trial, Charles settled with Giant Eagle for $22,500.00, and
released only Giant Eagle from their pro-rata share of liability. 6
Subsequently, the jury found Charles' damages to be $31,000.00,69
apportioning liability at 60074 for Stanley and 40% for Giant Eagle.
Plaintiff was found not comparatively negligent. Giant Eagle's liability amounted to $18,600.00, while Stanley was liable for $12,400.00,
as per jury verdict. 70 Stanley entered judgment on the verdict, stating
that since Giant Eagle had already paid plaintiff $22,500.00, Stanley
was now only liable for the balance, or $8,500.00.11 The trial court72
agreed with Stanley, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed.
Charles petitioned for, and was granted allocatur by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. 73 There, appellant renewed his argument that
because of comparative negligence he should be able to keep the
entire Giant Eagle settlement value, and at the same time, require
Stanley to pay its full pro-rata share, thus resulting in a windfall for
the plaintiff. 74 Giant Eagle, on the other hand, argued that plaintiff
should receive only the amount of damages awarded by the jury,
while requiring Stanley to contribute to Giant Eagle in the amount
that Giant Eagle paid in excess of their pro-rata share, 75 pursuant to
Mong.76 Although Giant Eagle had the case law on its side, the
supreme court agreed with the argument of the plaintiff, thus
overruling 77 both Daugherty78 and Mong.79
The supreme court ultimately apportioned damages as follows:
plaintiff received $22,500.00 from Giant Eagle and $12,500.00 from
Stanley, totalling $35,000.00. Giant Eagle could not seek contribution

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 483, 522 A.2d at 5.
Id. at 476, 522 A.2d at 2.
Id. at 483-84, 522 A.2d at 5.
Id. at 484, 522 A.2d at 5.
Id.
Id.
Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 330 Pa. Super. 76, 478 A.2d 1359 (1984).
Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. at 485, 522 A.2d at 6.
Id.
Id.
Mong, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427.
Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. at 485, 522 A.2d at 6.
Daughtery, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
Mong, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427.
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from Stanley upon the reasoning that settlements should be encouraged through reliance on the benefit of the bargain.80 The court
basically relied on the comparative negligence statute 81 for determining
the outcome of this case. The statute is set out, in pertinent part,
below:
§ 7102. Comparative negligence.
[Ejach defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar
amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal
negligence attributed to all defendants...[.1 Any defendant who is so
compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution. 2 (Emphasis added.)
The word "compelled" seemed to weigh heavily upon the minds of
the court when the Giant Eagle decision was made.8 3 It was held that
since Giant Eagle voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement, it
was not so "compelled" to pay more than its percentage of liability.8 4
Since this method of contribution admittedly does promote settlements by keeping them final and static, it would almost be fathomable
to arrive at such a definition of "compelled." However, there is
another statute which is arguably applicable. The Pennsylvania Contribution Statute85 reads as follows:
§ 8326. Effect of release as to other tort-feasors.
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before
or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-fesors unless the
release so provides, but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasor
in the amount of the consideration payed [sic] for the release or in
any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total
claim shall be reduced if greater than the consideration paid.86 (Emphasis added.)
This statute is the one used by Justice Zappala in his dissenting
opinion, although I believe that at least one other statute was
misused. 87 An argument made by Justice Zappala which seems directly
on point, is his conclusion 8 that the majority made an error by

80.
81.
82.
83.

Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. at 495, 522 A.2d at 10-11.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1978).
Id.
Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. at 495, 522 A.2d at 11.

84. Id.
85. 42 PA. CONS.
a reenactment of 12 PA.
86. Id.

STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.

§ 8326 (Purdon 1978). This section is basically
§ 2085 (Purdon 1951).

87. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8324 (Purdon 1978). See infra note 99 and
accompanying text.
88. Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. at 496, 522 A.2d at 11.
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apportioning damages pursuant to the comparative negligence statute 89 while seemingly ignoring relevant portions of the contribution
statute.90 This conclusion virtually clings to the rule established by
Daugherty9' and Mong.92 Justice Zappala stated that the majority's
conclusion, that the verdict should always be reduced only by the
pro-rata share of the settling tort-feasor, is "simply incredible", in
that it contravenes express, unambiguous statutory language to the
94
contrary. 93 This language is emphasized in the statutory quote above.
As just intimated, it appears as though Justice Zappala would
favor a return to Daugherty5 and Mong,9 thus allowing Giant Eagle
contribution from StanleyY Under this prior law, Stanley would pay
plaintiff only the balance of the total damages minus the settlement
value.98 I do not agree with either the dissent or the cases previously
condoning such result. Justice Zappala relies on the section of the
contribution statute dealing with the right to contribution." The
relevant subsection of this same statute, which was apparently ignored, reads as follows:
(c) Effect of settlement-A joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution
from another joint tort-feasor whose liability to the injured person is
not extinguished by the settlement. 100
The statute actually speaks for itself, for in this case Giant Eagle
settled, and the release applied only to Giant Eagle. This statutory
language is equally plain and unambiguous, therefore, Giant Eagle
should not be allowed contribution.
Perhaps a better understanding of the system condoned by the
majority, as well as Justice Zappala's dissenting view, can be obtained
by applying both views to the prototype hypothetical. Applying Justice
Zappala's theory to the hypothetical yields a result identical to that

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1978).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1978).
Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
Mong, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427.
Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. at 496, 522 A.2d at 11.
See supra text accompanying note 86.
Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
Mong, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427.
Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. at 508, 522 A.2d at 17.
Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8324 (Purdon 1978).
Id.
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achieved when the Daugherty'0 and Mong'0 2 scenario was applied to
the hypothetical.0 3 The Giant Eagle'°4 majority view is applied as
follows. P gets a $22,000.00 total recovery; $10,000.00 from Y by the
terms of the settlement, and $12,000.00 from X, according to his
percentage of liability. Y may not seek contribution because he was
not "compelled" to pay more than his pro-rata share, rather, his
overpayment was voluntary. As per Justice Zappala's view, this result,
in part, simply contravenes direct, unambiguous language of the
Pennsylvania Contribution Statute mandating that the entire judgment
should be reduced by the consideration paid for the release; or the
settling tort-feasor's pro-rata share, whichever is greater.105
If we look at the majority's view from another perspective; a
perspective absent all statutory guidance, save the comparative negligence statute,1°6 it does appear fair. The supposed goal of the contribution statute' °7 is to promote settlement, which the majority's view
certainly does by holding settlements static. In the hypothetical, for
example, P and Y entered into a contract. The contract stated that P
would release Y from all liability for the stated sum of $10,000.00.
This is a contract, final and binding as to the concerned parties, and
° allows for this. On the other hand,
the majority view in Giant Eagle'0
X does not escape paying the full amount of his percentage of liability.
Furthermore, Y should not be allowed contribution because the contract was separate from the court proceedings and the contract was,
in fact, entered into expressly to avoid the proceedings that Y would
argue allegedly conferred this right of contribution upon him. That P
receives a windfall is also of no consequence, since it is not actually
a windfall but a stipulated sum of money received pursuant to a
written agreement which is supported by consideration. Also, the
contract for settlement could easily have been for less than what Y
would have paid under the jury verdict, and, by reversing the arguments for the above parties, the same logical, equitable result is
reached.
The problem with the majority view, as well as the dissenting view,
lies not with their reasoning, which is perfectly sound, but with the

101.
102.
103.
104.

105.
106.
107.
108.

Daugherty, 386 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730.
Mong, 200 Pa. Super. 68, 186 A.2d 427.
See supra notes 55 - 60 and accompanying text.
Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1978).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1978).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8321, et seq. (Purdon 1978).
Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1.
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way in which the statutory authority was apparently ignored. If all of
the relevant statutory authority 09 is applied to our hypothetical, the
following result would be reached. Y would pay $10,000.00 pursuant
to his contract with P. X would pay only the difference between the
jury verdict, $20,000.00, and the amount Y paid P for the settlement,
$10,000.00, or the $10,000.00 total, regardless of the percentage of
liability since the consideration paid was greater than Y's pro-rata
share of liability." 0 Plaintiff would receive only the amount of the
jury verdict. Y has no right to contribution since there is express
2
statutory authority which forbids it,"' and other statutory language
which when read in conjunction with the former language" 3 can only
be interpreted to allow contribution when one tort-feasor is "compelled" by judgment to pay the full amount."14 The conclusions reached
thus far are that the Giant Eagle"5 majority was wrong about how
much the verdict is reduced by a prior settlement, and that the dissent
6
is wrong in deciding that Giant Eagle should be allowed contribution."1
Perhaps the point to be reached by way of the above conglomeration
is simply that the courts might fare better in this area by applying the
statutory law as it is written and meant to be interpreted. Significant
change should be left to the legislature. Normally, this statement would
be viewed as a quick way around the problem. But when faced with
a concept apparently as complex as contribution, it is no aid to
.practicing lawyers to read the plain language in the statute only to
find that they must have been reading Sanskrit" 7 when they read the
cases interpreting the language. A possible solution to the confusion
that may result from super-legislating is to apply the existing statutory
law to the facts, as was done with the hypothetical, and not inject
equitable morals into an area where it would contravene direct statutory
authority. When the legislature gets the message, a process which will
certainly be accelerated by the Giant Eagle"8 decision, the forthcoming
change will originate from the proper place.
John W. Bitonti
109.

42

PA. CONS. STAT.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

42
42
42
42
42

PA.
PA.
PA.
PA.
PA.

115.
116.
117.
118.

Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1.
Id. at 496, 522 A.2d at 11.
An ancient form of language and written communication.
Giant Eagle, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1.

CONS.
CONS.
CONS.
CONS.
CONS.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

ANN. §§ 7102 and 8321, et seq. (Purdon 1978).
ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1978).
ANN. § 8324 (Purdon 1978).
ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1978).
ANN. § 8324 (Purdon 1978).
ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1978).

